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Regulation and discipline 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 This chapter explores the regulation of legal professions. It looks at different theories of 
regulation before outlining the argument for self-regulation of legal services providers. It then 
considers ways in which future practitioners are prepared to make ethical choices by legal 
education and training. It also outlines the regulatory mechanisms used and the place of codes of 
conduct in ensuring ethical performance. The chapter concludes by outlining the change in 
regulatory philosophy prompted by the Legal Services Act 2007. Traditional methods of 
regulation are juxtaposed with the regulatory regimes beginning to emerge in response to the 
Act. 
 
THEORIES OF REGULATION 
Definition 
 Regulation is a contested term with at least three current meanings.1 The first conceives 
of regulation as a set of authoritative and targeted rules, issued by a public agency or similar 
body. The second sees regulation as direct state intervention in steering the economy through its 
agencies, using tools such as contracting or state ownership. The third meaning sees 
mechanisms of social control, whoever exercises them and whether they are intended to 
facilitate or control, or not, as regulation.  The last of these three meanings would include 
within the definition of regulation anything that might produce effects on behaviour. This could 
include workplace or other environments.     
Regulation types and strategies  
Government regulation 
i. Command and control regulation 
 Command and control regulation describes the direct regulation of an industry by the 
state, usually through legislation. It involves the specification of quality standards (command) 
with specified sanctions for breach (control). A criticism of command and control approaches 
is that they aim to deter non-compliance rather than to encourage compliance. Its operation is 
therefore remedial rather than preventative.  
 A problem with implementing an effective command and control regime is that 
standards need to be specified accurately and on a large scale (for example, the level of 
carbon emission at a factory). A command and control regime is less feasible where it is 
difficult to specify quantitative standards. These various criticisms may contribute to 
command and control approaches being relatively ineffective in changing behaviour in the 
economic and organizational spheres. 
ii. Indirect government regulation 
 Governments can regulate indirectly by inviting bids for franchises or contracts, the 
terms of which incorporate regulatory objectives. Contractors can also be required to submit 
to pre-existing quality control regimes as a term of the contract. The eminent sociologist Max 
Weber was ambivalent about state bureaucracy impinging on civil society. He saw state 
interference as an efficient, even necessary, form of organisation, but also an ‘iron cage’, 
inducing conformity and threatening individual freedom. 
Types of self-regulation 
i. Self-regulation 
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 Self-regulation is justified by a situation of market failure. An example is where 
consumers cannot judge the product they are buying. This is usually the case with legal 
services. This is a situation of information asymmetries, where the producer knows more than 
the purchaser. Self-regulation is a good solution when private law cannot correct this problem 
adequately or cheaply enough, or where conventional public regulation is less good or more 
expensive.2  
 The preference for self-regulation over public regulation largely stems from the 
expertise held by the regulated sector. Formulating, implementing and amending standards is 
arguably cheaper for a self-regulatory agency than an external agency. Monitoring and 
enforcement costs are reduced and borne by the industry, rather than the taxpayer.  
There are many concerns about the legitimacy and economic effect of self-regulation. 
Self-regulatory agencies that are not democratic cannot legitimately represent their 
membership. The accumulation of too many functions, from rule formation to enforcement 
for example, offends the principle of the separation of powers. Restrictions on entry to self-
regulated industries, and ‘rules of etiquette’, can restrict the supply of services. This enables 
those in self-regulated industries to claim higher profits, ‘rents’, than would be available in a 
competitive market.  
ii. Enforced Self-regulation 
    Concern that self-regulation can too easily favour the regulated group have led to 
adjustments in regimes. Schemes whereby industries make their own rules, but have them 
approved by public agencies, are potentially more efficient and less costly than direct state 
regulation. Such schemes have been called ‘enforced self-regulation’.3 These regimes are 
often supported by compliance officers within firms who are under an obligation to report 
regulatory infractions. Regimes involving state monitoring were originally advocated as a 
way of dealing with self-regulatory failure.  
Enforced self-regulation can be accompanied by strategies to increase competition 
and reduce rents. Competition between self-regulatory agencies can be sufficient to reduce 
prices, but this alone is not a solution. Ideally, consumers should be able to purchase the 
quality they can afford. Unfortunately, if consumers can compare price but not quality, this 
may force quality to be consistently cut, leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. Therefore, some 
control over quality needs to be exercised. This can be provided by external rating agencies, 
or by a public agency charged with eliminating anti-competitive practices and maintaining 
minimum quality standards. 
Mixed regulation  
 A number of different regulatory regimes can be operated as part of a self- regulatory 
regime or, more typically, though a government appointed agency.  
i. Responsive regulation 
Responsive regulation proposes an alternative to the choice between deterrence 
regimes, punishing after the event, and compliance regimes, involving preventative 
persuasion. Combined strategies, of initial persuasion, followed up by deterrent sanctions for 
recalcitrant offenders, offers a dual approach.4 It also forms a part of a wider suite, or 
pyramid, of strategies, starting with self-regulation but ending with strictly enforced sanctions 
for non-compliance as a final step.  
Compliance regimes can be developed through ongoing relationships between 
regulators and regulated entities. Their success depends on the transparency and clear 
communication between the parties.5 Visits by regulators to regulated organisations check the 
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effectiveness of systems and the outcomes achieved. This may result in recommendations for 
change, for example, to systems. The focus of such visits can also escalate to other processes, 
such as disciplinary investigations, or to involve other sanctions, such as fines.  
There are a number of potential problems with such regimes. Their success depends 
on a number of factors including the resources available for regulatory activity, the attitudes 
of regulators and political support for intervention. It is useful that the regulator has a wide 
range of sanctions available. If the only sanction is extremely serious it is less likely to be 
used. However, if the use of sanctions depends on co-operation with the regulator, there is a 
risk that different sanctions will be applied for the same offence, thus undermining the 
legitimacy of the regime. 
ii. Risk-based regulation    
In 2005 the Hampton Review proposed that regulatory agencies should focus 
resources on the regulated parties posing the biggest risk that the regulator would not achieve 
its regulatory objectives. Risk-based strategies assume that there is an evidence base that 
allows risks to be assessed. This may lead to the risks identified being historic problems 
rather than prospective ones. There should also be a process of prioritization of risks at a high 
level. If transparent systems are in place it is likely that reporting of these priorities will 
evoke a hostile reaction.  
iii. Reflexive regulation 
 Reflexive regulation refers to the idea that regulators and the regulated learn from and 
respond to the experience of regulation. Both adjust their behaviour accordingly, with the 
regulator taking on board new approaches and strategies according to what works.6 
Mechanisms for this can be seen in proposals for the development of responsive regulation to 
take account of factors such as the attitudes of regulated parties, the wider regulatory 
environment and the interplay of regulatory tools.7 Through a reflexive process, regulators 
can re-assess and re-design regulatory strategy.   
Choice of regulatory system 
 Self-regulation is often associated with detailed disciplinary rules and codes of 
conduct. Regulation by public authority tends to be associated with administrative regimes. 
These may use a range of tools including inspection, audit and advice. These can be used in 
association with regulatory codes, although possibly not as detailed as a professional code of 
conduct. However, the strategies of mixed regulation could be used in a context of self-
regulation. Likewise, a situation of enforced self-regulation could take on the characteristics 
of a mixed system.   
 A number of factors bear on the choice of system including the current situation of an 
industry, the history of performance of that industry and the approach of the state to the issue 
of regulation. As a generalization, hierarchical societies are more likely to favour direct 
government regulation, individualist societies to favour de-regulation and light touch 
regulation and egalitarian societies to prefer participatory models.8 
 
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION  
 Self-regulation  
 As the legal professional bodies grew in organisation and confidence they took on the 
task of guaranteeing the behaviour and performance of members. They therefore exercised 
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disciplinary powers over members. Effective disciplinary machinery was essential because, 
without prescription or sanction, rules may not provide effective control of the whole 
membership.9 Formal powers to discipline members were eventually delegated by the state and 
the professions operated disciplinary tribunals. The machinery supporting control of the legal 
profession, including disciplinary, educational and other mechanisms, is known as self-
regulation.  
 When the legal professions first emerged, state regulation of occupations was 
rudimentary. The explanation for this is that, as professional practice became more 
sophisticated, it became incomprehensible to outsiders. External regulation was therefore seen as 
impracticable. With the growth of the regulatory state (see Chapter 2) the effectiveness of self-
regulation was contested. This was partly because professional bodies also represented 
members’ interests giving them conflicting roles. Therefore, the legal professions in England 
and Wales currently operate under a regime closer to enforced self-regulation. This is described 
in more detail later in the chapter.  
 Regulation of the right to practice 
 Regulation of the right to practice is a fundamental aspect of the professional control of 
legal markets. The right to practice is protected by statute. It is an offence for an unqualified 
person to act as a solicitor, ‘wilfully pretend to be’ a solicitor or imply that he or she is a 
solicitor.10 Under the Legal Services Act 2007 ‘authorised persons’ in England and Wales can 
only undertake the reserved legal activities that their regulator can authorise and which that 
regulator has authorised them to undertake. Some areas of work, such as immigration and 
asylum, for example, can be done by non-lawyers.  
 Some jurisdictions are open to lawyers from other states operating in their jurisdiction, 
although they may not be able to do exactly the same things as home qualified lawyers. 
Following EU directives in 1989 and 1998, qualified lawyers from EU member states can 
practice in other EU jurisdictions under their own title. They must register with the SRA. They 
can also qualify as a lawyer of their host state provided they fill any gaps in their knowledge and 
skills. The host state must facilitate this by providing suitable assessments.11  
 
PREPARATION FOR PRACTICE 
Socialisation into professional values 
 It is important not to ignore the fact that there are reasons, other than sanctions, why 
rules work. This is because everybody is socialised into a set of behaviours by family and other 
institutions. Professions provide occupational socialisation, building on these earlier stages. 
Membership, identification and peer pressure provided by the professional group as a whole, 
counterbalances workplace pressure to drop standards. Entrants to professions are socialised into 
values throughout their education and training and beyond. It is important, therefore, to consider 
whether professional structures, taken as a whole, support ethical performance of member 
practitioners.  
i. Education 
 Knowledge is the foundation of professional authority. Education and training is the 
core responsibility of regulation. Institutionalised legal education consolidates, expands and 
theorises the knowledge base in universities. It is also symbolically important. Because 
professional knowledge changes, professional education is a lifelong activity. It used to be 
assumed that professionals acquired wisdom through experience. Nowadays, they are likely 
to be subject to compulsory Continuing Professional Development programmes. These 
typically require attendance at a given number of lectures a year as a condition of practice.  
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 The length of education and training signifies the intrinsic difficulty of assimilation 
and mastery of professional knowledge and skill. Larsson suggests that one of the reasons for 
professional monopolies is so that intending professionals are not dissuaded from investing 
time, effort and money in education and training. The result is that the education process can 
be seen as unnecessarily lengthy and complex. Moreover, it is arguable that it pays 
insufficient attention to moral values. It typically pays professional ethics, arguably one of 
the fundamental building blocks of professional practice, little attention. This can be 
attributed to the way in which University legal education developed.  
 ii. The curriculum   
 A method of study based on analysis of cases and precedents evolved in England in 
the nineteenth century under the influence of a largely Oxford based elite. The case method 
involved the systematisation, exposition and analysis of legal doctrine.12 The popularity of 
the case method is attributed to the Harvard Law professor Christopher Columbus Langdell 
who, in 1887, asserted that ‘Law is a science, and that all the available materials of that 
science are contained in printed books’.13  
 The case method became entrenched in English university law teaching between 1850 
and 1907. Its material was ‘black letter law’, a term derived from the presentation of basic 
legal principles in bold type in traditional texts.14 The general approach became universal, 
although it took different forms in different jurisdictions.  In the US the ‘Socratic method’ 
required students to state the facts of the case, the outcome and whether it was ‘good’ law. 
 The case method is integral to legal positivism, which holds that the legal and the 
moral are separate realms. Positivism defines ‘law’ as that material formally enacted by 
designated authorities. This contrasts with natural law, which suggests universal principles of 
morality, religion, and justice must be present for norms to be called ‘law’.  Sugarman 
argues that the adoption of legal positivism by universities created an area of autonomy 
between the university, the profession and the state. Practitioners were masters of the relation 
between law and facts but legal academics ‘… were masters of the principles of law… facts 
and reality were kept at a safe distance’.15  
 From the early nineteen hundreds, law became a subject in many provincial 
universities. It was often developed with local law societies and taught by local practitioners. 
As a result, these provincial courses took a practical approach.16 In 1913 the Haldane 
Commission promoted the combination of theory and practice, excluding social, political or 
moral context, with support from the academy.17 In a post-war review of legal education, the 
president of the Society of Public Teachers of Law said that legal education should be based 
on precedent, not legislation. Criticising law and discussing law reform was dangerously like 
sociology, and impinged on the objectivity necessary for legal study.  
 As legal education developed in the twentieth century, university law schools clung to 
the scientific pretensions of positivism. By the 1950s the doctrinal approach to legal study 
was under challenge. Some legal academics argued that lawyers should know some 
economics, political science and sociology as well as legal cases. In the 1970s, critics argued 
that the pedagogy of the case method stimulates competitiveness, orthodoxy and 
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conservatism, turning students away from whatever public service orientations stimulated 
their interest in law.18  
 Legal positivism fell out of favour with many academics from the 1960s onwards. 
The professional bodies encouraged the idea that law should be taught ‘in context’ 
encouraging a multi-disciplinary approach.19 The evolution of legal studies from the 1960s 
coincided with the growth of socio-legal research in universities. This involved the empirical 
investigation of legal phenomena using the methods of the social sciences.  
 The multi-disciplinary approach to law broke the stranglehold of conventional legal 
study. It was a form of knowledge that was not found in practice but was valuable in law 
reform, as evidenced by the establishment of the Law Commission in 1965. The adoption of a 
broader approach to academic legal study began a debate about what legal education was for.  
 A broad consensus emerged between professional policy makers and University law 
lecturers that limited the scope of undergraduate legal education. It was only to contribute to 
professional development by laying the foundations of legal study through substantive core 
subjects. Study of the legal system, or skills or ethics was not required. This accommodated 
Law Schools to a wider university culture. This was  based on a liberal ideal and the neutral 
values of scientific inquiry.  
 Universities have a liberal ethos in which independence is a key value. Bradney 
identifies John Henry Newman, the 19th Century Roman Catholic cardinal and academic, as 
an inspiration for this liberal ideal. Newman wished to build a Catholic University for 
Catholic students. He recognised, however, that he needed to be able to publish free from 
church interference.  
 Newman’s view of liberal education was that it 'apprehends the great outlines of 
knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its 
great points and its little... A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the 
attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation and wisdom.'20 This vision is 
usually antithetical to vocational or other ‘non-academic’ values.  
 Despite the absence of vocational content, legal professions often specify much of the 
undergraduate law curriculum as a mandatory prerequisite of progress to vocational 
qualification. There is no strong rationale for most of the content. Nevertheless, in much of 
the common law world, further courses and an apprenticeship in practice is required.  
 Over the past 25 years vocational courses have developed a distinct methodology, 
integrating skills into practice subjects. They have increasingly required that professional 
ethics be taught as part of the curriculum. The focus has often been on a few rules of conduct. 
The result is that there is nowhere in the whole of legal education that professional ethics 
receives full treatment. 
 Glasser argued that, as the membership of professions becomes more diverse, and 
experiences of practice diverge, education would need to provide ‘the cement’ binding the 
legal profession together.21 It might therefore be expected that education and training would 
play a greater role in professional socialisation. This may suggest a need for programmes 
traversing the conventional stages of education and training.  
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 Requiring the initial stage to cover ethical materials would have a number of 
advantages. It would provide a common platform for the vocational stage, where a common 
understanding of ethics could be assumed. This would enable the vocational stage to adopt 
more ambitious aims and lay the foundation for higher levels of education and training at the 
training and post-qualification stages. 
The Legal and Education and Training Review for England and Wales, which reported 
in 2013, came to remarkably mixed conclusions about ethics. Legal and Professional Ethics was 
rated one the two most important knowledge areas by barristers solicitors and CILEX members 
in an online survey conducted for the review. Only contract law and tort, third and fourth 
respectively, commanded anywhere near the same general consensus.      
 
 
INSERT TB 
THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
REGULATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (June 2013) 
Ethics, values and professionalism  
 4.65 This was rated the most important knowledge area in the LETR online survey, a result which 
echoed the demand for a greater emphasis on professional ethics and conduct across the qualitative data and 
stakeholder responses to Discussion Papers. It is also an area that bridges the affective/moral domain and ‘habits 
of mind’, as well as the cognitive dimension.  
 4.66 An increased emphasis on ethics and legal values in LSET would be consistent with the focus of 
the LSA 2007 regulatory objectives, and the need to develop a more thoughtful and contextual approach to 
professional obligations, particularly where those are expressed via principles-based regulation or OFR rather 
than detailed rules. It is suggested that all approved regulators review the treatment of ethics and 
professionalism within their education and training regimes to ensure that the subject is addressed with the 
prominence and in the depth appropriate to the public profession of law.  
 4.67 A majority of respondents took the view that ethics and professionalism need to be developed 
throughout the continuum of education and training. This view is accepted and underpins a number of the final 
recommendations in this report. The approach taken in Scotland which seeks to develop professionalism as a distinct 
foundation for both the professional training (PEAT 1) and work-based (PEAT 2) stages of training is also 
commended, not least for its capacity to link commitments to personal integrity, continuing improvement, public 
service and diversity to the legal role. 
Affective/moral  
4.83 The affective and moral dimensions are critical to professional practice, and aspects of them are 
widely captured in competence frameworks - aside from the purely cognitive dimension of professional ethics 
and regulation. Independence and integrity are particularly valued in Briefing Paper 1/2012 and ‘honesty and 
integrity’ was also a highly-ranked attribute in the LETR online survey (Chapter 2, Table 2.8). Respect for 
clients and co-workers is also commonly identified, though consumer data suggest that respect for, and empathy 
with, clients are areas where there are still significant gaps between expectation and reality (eg, Vanilla 
Research, 2010; YouGov, 2011). 
… 
 4.104 It should be noted that, despite the general emphasis placed on legal ethics and professional 
values, there was no majority support for the introduction of professional ethics as a further Foundation subject 
for the QLD/GDL. This does not preclude the academic stage from providing an important basis for the study of 
professional ethics. Hence it is proposed that the QLD/GDL should include outcomes that advance an awareness 
and understanding of the values embedded in law, legal processes and solutions, and the role of lawyers in 
advancing those values. Further, it is recommended that some understanding of underlying legal values should 
be incorporated in the education and training of any authorised person. 
4.105 At the same time, institutions should not be required to devote more than the existing 180 credits 
to any prescribed Foundation subjects. This fits with comparable approaches internationally.51 It is important to 
acknowledge that the traditional professions are now a minority career destination for law graduates, and 
university law schools also have their own legitimate and distinctive objectives for the degree (see, eg, Legal 
Services Institute 2010, 2012; cf Devlin et al, 2009), which should be respected. 
4.143 Outcomes will reflect the knowledge, skills and understanding required of a practitioner. Aside 
from the need for domain knowledge, the outcomes must place sufficient emphasis on ethics and 
professionalism, core communication skills (oral and written communication and, in appropriate contexts, 
advocacy), business and social awareness, equality and diversity issues, and legal research. This approach 
highlights the need for a reasonable degree of transparency in knowledge outcomes and therefore for some 
increase in the specification of the Foundations of Legal Knowledge. 
Professionalism and ethics  
7.10 The perceived centrality of professionalism and ethics to practise across the regulated workforce is one of 
the clearest conclusions to be drawn from the LETR research. Legal ethics was rated ‘important’ or ‘somewhat 
important’ by over 90% of survey respondents and was seen as a defining feature of professional service in the 
qualitative data. A majority of respondents thought that an understanding of legal values, ethics and 
professionalism needs to be developed throughout legal services education and training. Views differed as to 
what that might mean in practice. There was no majority support for the introduction of professional ethics as a 
new Foundation of Legal Knowledge for the QLD/GDL. This does not prevent a basis g for the study of 
professional ethics being provided at the academic stage. There is general support for all authorised persons 
receiving some education in legal values, as well as the technical ‘law on lawyering’.  
7.11 Three other factors are also significant. The LSA 2007 regulatory objectives emphasise the centrality of the 
core ethical standards captured by s.1 LSA 2007 (‘professional principles’), as well as a wider notion, reflected 
across the objectives as a whole, of professional responsibility to society and to the rule of law. The 
development of OFR has also been seen to require a different approach to education and training in ethical 
values. Lastly, a greater emphasis on ethics would better align England and Wales to international practice, 
where a growing number of common law jurisdictions have included some element of ethics, professional 
governance/regulation and professionalism as part of both initial and continuing education and training in recent 
years. The impact in the US of the MacCrate statement of professional values, and the introduction of a 
‘professionalism’ requirement across the Law Society of Scotland’s PEAT 1 and 2, are influential examples. 
The PEAT definition of professionalism is particularly commended as a way of capturing the wider 
commitments of legal professionals to society, addressing:  
• the interests of justice and democracy;  
• effective and competent legal services on behalf of a client;  
• continuing professional education and personal development;  
• diversity and public service;  
• trust, respect and personal integrity. 
 
END TB 
ii. Induction into a community 
Many professions require that entrants go through a period of training, like an 
apprenticeship, before admission. Trainees are usually required to work under the guidance of 
an established practitioner. They develop the ability to apply their knowledge and the practical 
skills associated with that area of practice. It is arguable that they also develop relevant 
attitudes and values through this process.   
In addition to apprenticeship, professions may require that entrants acquire experience 
within the broader professional community. Indeed, Larsson argues that community and 
ethicality are intimately related. It is in the culture of professions that explain the origins of 
practices and norms. The possibility of regulation by the community of peers began to be 
realised with concentrations of lawyers at the Inns of Court. This is a prime example of 
induction into a discernible ethical community.     
As part of the induction to the profession the Inns of Court typically require that students 
dine in the Inn a number of times before being called to the Bar. It is seen as one of the ways of 
inducting entrants into the culture of the Bar. Many students resented having to travel to 
London, and pay for a dinner, just to satisfy what seemed to be a quaint tradition. To many it 
seemed like an outdated requirement that served no purpose. To the Inns dining was an 
important symbolic commitment.  
 The Inns eventually found an ingenious compromise to the dining requirement. 
Students are now required to complete 12 ‘units’ in order to be called to the Bar.22 These are 
known as qualifying sessions and are defined as ‘educational and collegiate activities arranged 
by or on behalf of the Inn for the purpose of preparing junior barristers for practice’. These 
sessions typically include 'dining sessions', with senior practitioners, but need not do so. 
Nowadays, therefore, it is usual for ‘dining’ to accompany relevant talks and training 
workshops. Even these limited requirements are sometimes resented.23  
 
REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
Early systems of control  
The regulation of early lawyers was largely by the monarch and through the courts. The 
first legislation concerned with the behaviour of lawyers was the Statute of Westminster 
(1275). This imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a term of one year and a day and 
disbarment on a lawyer for an act of deception. From 1280 London courts had codes of 
conduct applying to all practising lawyers. Serjeants practising in the courts swore an oath to 
uphold the dignity of the city courts. Attorneys charged with breaches of discipline were tried 
by juries composed of other attorneys. 
Mixed regulatory controls 
The use of different systems of professional regulation persists to the present day. In the 
early 1990s Wilkins identifies four systems that tend to be used in common law 
jurisdictions.24  There are the disciplinary controls exercised by legal professions under the 
supervision of the courts, institutional controls operating in the relevant practice forum (for 
example, a court) legislative controls operated by administrative agencies and liability 
controls, for example, negligence claims. All of these tend to operate, to some degree, in 
different spheres. The balance between them often reflects the effectiveness of each in 
controlling lawyer behaviour in its particular sphere.  
Professional controls  
Self-regulating professions usually control all aspects of professional behaviour, 
including education and training. Following the collegial principle, professions tend to 
operate as a heterarchy. This tends to mean that, as far as belonging to the profession is 
concerned, full members do not have a rank. In contrast to a hierarchy, none of those in a 
heterarchy are subordinate to others. In theory, the professional standards apply equally to all 
members, whatever their status and circumstances.  
 Professional self-regulation usually also includes disciplinary processes for lawyers who 
have broken disciplinary rules. These typically involve the regulator bringing proceedings 
before a panel composed of members of the profession. The panels usually have wide powers of 
discipline, including the power to remove a practitioner’s rights to practice. Increasingly, these 
panels are required to include lay members.  
Forum controls  
 Most forums in which lawyers practice exercise some control over practitioners. These 
take a variety of forms. Therefore, courts and tribunals may have the power to impose 
disciplinary sanctions while proceedings are ongoing. However, when there are effective 
disciplinary proceedings in place, judges are more likely to refer lawyers to their professional 
regulator. It is becoming increasingly common for courts to order that lawyers pay costs to the 
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other side when they have behaved unreasonably in legal proceedings. These ‘wasted costs 
orders’ are covered in more detail in Chapter 7: Third Parties. 
Legislative controls  
 Legislative controls of lawyers tend to be light when self-regulation operates. 
Increasingly, however, legislation is used to control some legal professions. In England and 
Wales, the Legal Services Act 2007, which created the Legal Services Board, is a good example 
of this.  
Liability controls  
Lawyers are often liable to either their clients, or to a limited range of third parties, in 
circumstances where their negligence causes loss. Until 2000, liability for negligence did not 
extend to advocates presenting cases in court. This immunity was based on two main policy 
grounds. The first was that to allow clients to sue advocates could lead to the endless re-
hearing of cases. The second was that the prospect of liability to clients may encourage 
advocates to put their duty to clients above their duty to the court. The House of Lords 
dismissed both arguments in the case of Hall v Simons.25  
 
ETHICAL STANDARDS AND DECISION-MAKING 
Codes of conduct 
The ethical standards of practitioners derive from the work they perform. These 
standards are often systematised and reproduced as a code of conduct. Codes of conduct take 
various forms. Most codes of conduct appear as a set of rules. These aim to prescribe clearly 
what behaviour is required in different situations. However, conduct rules often have different 
degrees of force. The language of some provisions requires certain behaviour in given situations, 
for example, where they provide that ‘you must’ do something. Others are more aspirational, for 
example, ‘you should’ do something.  
The usefulness of codes in making ethical decisions 
Codes of conduct may make it clear what the rules are, but they do not take all of the 
effort out of ethical decision-making. Even if they are comprehensive, professional codes 
cannot answer every question arising in professional work. The rules in different parts of a 
code of conduct may conflict, leaving doubt about which should prevail. Problems arise 
where applying a rule produces an outcome considered to be unethical. In these instances, 
professionals are presented with an ethical dilemma. There are various theories that may be 
useful in considering how such dilemmas should be resolved.   
Ethical theories  
Ethics is a branch of philosophy concerned with how people make good and right 
decisions on the issues confronting them. Different ethical theories suggest distinct ways of 
thinking about making such decisions. Four main approaches are considered here. 
Considering these theories is necessary in order to illustrate the different possibilities for 
reaching ethical decisions and the intrinsic difficulty of making such decisions. It also shows 
how ethical decisions may be contestable. 
Four theories about how practitioners should approach ethical dilemmas are Deontology, 
Consequentialism, Virtue Ethics and Principlism. Deontology, is concerned with whether there 
is a duty to behave in a particular way.26 Consequentialism, advocates that one must consider 
outcomes before deciding on a course of action. Virtue ethics is based on the proposition that 
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good character is essential to ethical decision making. Principlism is based on the idea that 
practical ethical decisions should be based on a small number of universal principles.  
It is not suggested that practitioners explicitly use one or more ethical theory in any 
given situation. In practice, decision-making tends to be intuitive. However, although 
practitioners may not consciously apply ethical theory, it is useful to be aware of the practical 
implications of theory.   
Deontology and consequentialism 
Deontic ethics assumes that certain actions are right in themselves, carrying a duty to 
act according to principle, irrespective of consequences. For example, Kant proposes that it is 
wrong to lie, even to a murderer seeking the location of an intended victim.27 This illustrates 
the weakness of deontology. It is inflexible and may lead to unnecessary harm. Attempting to 
regulate behaviour by rules of conduct is sometimes referred to as deontology. The ethicality 
of an act is judged by the extent to which it complies with a rule. 
Consequentialism, seeks justification for actions by considering results. Act-
consequentialism considers the result of each act, while rule-consequentialism appraises the 
results of general rules requiring or permitting acts. 28 Utilitarianism, the best-known form of 
Consequentialism,29 values actions achieving the overall or average well-being of people. 
This can be measured with reference to intensity, duration, propinquity and extent of benefit.30  
The weakness of consequentialism is that it could be difficult to apply where the 
outcomes of a particular action are not obvious. It may therefore be a methodology better 
suited to calm reflection in the light of complex data. It may be more difficult for a busy 
practitioner to take a consequentialist approach in their everyday work.  
Virtue ethics 
Aretaic or virtue ethics, are traceable to the Ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle. Virtue 
ethicists argue that it is the possession of inner traits, or character, that make an individual’s 
actions ethical. Therefore, ethical actions are those that a virtuous person would carry out in a 
particular situation. As is obvious, this is not particularly helpful to someone who is not sure if 
they are virtuous, but still want to do the right thing. Despite this limitation, virtue ethics are 
potentially useful in determining the profile of ideal professionals and thinking about how to 
educate them.      
To the Greeks virtues are social goods contributing to a goal, or telos.  The human telos 
was a good society achieved through ‘intellectual virtue’, the ability to think and reason, and 
moral actions for their own sake.31 According to Aristotle, virtue becomes a habit. The virtuous 
individual reacts naturally and morally correctly.32 Aristotle conceived of virtues as a balance 
between extreme behaviours. The virtue of courage, for example, lies between cowardice and 
rashness. Which virtues are selected for a particular purpose depends on the desired end.  
Virtues, or ‘excellences’ are each unique aspects of human potential, the realisation of 
which make one person more human, or excellent, than another. Some are more relevant for 
people in certain roles, or in certain situation, than others. Much discussion about professional 
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ethics relates to whether people can be educated and trained to be virtuous and, if so, how. Is it 
enough that people understand ethical obligations or do they also need to develop certain 
capacities, such as empathy?   
 Research conducted by the University of Birmingham Centre for Character and 
Virtues, asked four groups, undergraduates, vocational course students, solicitors and 
barristers to select ‘… six personal character strengths from a list of 24 and, later, from the 
same list of 24, select six character strengths they associated with the ‘ideal’ lawyer’. It is not 
clear from this whether participants were asked to identify strengths that they thought they 
possessed or that they thought were generally important.   The report of the research 
describes these as ‘self-reported character strengths’, suggesting that it is the former.  
 
Q3.1. What do you think might be the point of comparing one’s own character strengths with 
those of an ideal lawyer a) for the individual or b) otherwise. 
Q3.2. Which rank order of six character strengths do you think are most important to you 
personally, most important to society and most important in a lawyer  
 
 Personal   Society Lawyer 
Appreciation of beauty      
Bravery      
Creativity      
Curiosity     
Fairness     
Forgiveness     
Gratitude     
Honesty     
Hope     
Humour     
Judgement     
Kindness     
Leadership     
Love     
Love of Learning     
Modesty     
Perseverance     
Perspective     
Prudence     
Self-regulation     
Social intelligence     
Spirituality    
Teamwork     
Zest  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.3. How do you explain any differences between the rank orders? 
Q3.4. Comparing your six character strengths with those set out towards the end of Chapter 1 
under Professional values and virtues, are there any important character strengths missing from 
this list? 
Q3.5. What character strengths do you think you need to develop to be a lawyer?  
 
The Birmingham study went on to consider the results   
INSERT TB 
J Arthur, K Kristjansson, H Thomas, M Holdsworth, LB Confalonieri, T Qiu Virtuous 
Character for the Practice of Law (Birmingham, Jubilee Centre for Character and 
Virtues, University of Birmingham, 2014) 
 
4.1.2.1 Personal virtues 
Table 3 shows fairness, honesty, humour and perseverance as the most common 
personal virtues self-reported in all four respondent groups. Kindness and curiosity 
completed the six most commonly selected personal virtues for undergraduate students, 
while LPC/BPTC respondents identified curiosity and teamwork within their six. 
Of note was the finding that judgement was identified by both solicitors (whose 
six items also included kindness) and barristers (whose six items also included 
love of learning). 
4.1.2.2 Virtues of the ‘Ideal’ Lawyer Table 4 shows the six virtues of the ‘ideal’ 
lawyer most commonly selected by respondents [the Table shows a reasonably strong 
consensus across undergraduates, vocational course students, solicitors and barristers. In 
declining order of importance the virtues identified were judgement, perseverance, 
perspective, fairness, social intelligence and leadership].  
These findings show a greater concentration of choices than for personal virtues. As with the 
personal virtues, fairness and perseverance were among the most identified six virtues across 
the four groups with judgement and perspective also in the most identified six virtues for all 
four groups. 
That undergraduates and LPC/BPTC students identified judgement as a leading virtue of the 
‘ideal’ lawyer but that it was not in the top six personal virtues, while solicitors and barristers 
both identified it in their top six personal virtues and in the virtues of the ‘ideal’ lawyer, 
suggests that judgement is recognised as a central virtue for lawyers but one developed in 
practice rather than possessed at an early stage of their careers as legal professionals. 
For all groups, the top six items now account for a greater percentage of all choices and 
represent 64% and 67% of all choices by experienced lawyers. There is also greater 
agreement about the top six virtues of the ‘ideal’ lawyer than was the case when 
identifying their personal values. This is particularly apparent with the choice of 
judgement and honesty by experienced lawyers as they were selected as top six virtues by 
84% of solicitors and 93% of barristers. Bravery appears in the top six character strengths for 
an ‘ideal’ lawyer from the perspective of barristers, while teamwork 
is valued by solicitors; this difference may reflect the nature of their respective roles….  
What stands out from the comparison of the self-reported personal virtues and the ideal 
virtues is the greater correlation, across the career stages, in the virtues ascribed to the 
‘ideal’ lawyer than in the self-reported virtues.’ 
 
Q3.6.  Why might there be greater correlation between the virtues of an ideal lawyer than 
between self-reported virtues?  
Q3.7. Why might perceptions of the ideal lawyer’s virtues depend on the context of their 
work? 
 
END TB 
 
Principlism 
 Principlism is based on the idea that ethical conduct can be judged against a few, key 
criteria. An influential text by Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
provides a standard theoretical framework for analysing dilemma’s arising in medical 
ethics,33 but also claims wider applicability.  
 The four guiding principles are, autonomy (the right of an individual to make his or 
her own choice), beneficence (doing good and acting with the best interest of the other in 
mind), non-maleficence (not doing harm), and justice (achieving fairness and equality among 
individuals). These principles are intended to provide a practical framework for ethical 
decision making in pressured circumstances. 
 There are various criticisms of principlism. First, the selected principles may not 
reflect a universal consensus. The four principles selected by Beauchamp and Childress may 
represent dominant values in Western society, but not elsewhere. The prioritisation of moral 
autonomy, for example, reflects the individualistic values of the West, whereas  other 
societies may value community and other principles, like respect and purity, more highly.34 
  
 The second criticism of Principlism is that the four key principles provide no way of 
resolving conflict between them. The third is that, because they are so broad, the key 
principles provide little practical help with actual decision making. For example, even if we 
assume that the informed consent of a client shows respect for autonomy, there needs to be 
several subsidiary procedures and principles in place to specify what this means.35  
 
INSERT TB  
While acting for Company A, lawyer B discovers that it is engaged in activity that could 
result in environmental damage to a particular locality and possibly injury to people in 
that locality. Lawyer B’s code of conduct provides that he can only break client 
confidentiality in order to prevent serious injury to identifiable persons.  
 
Q3.8. How might ethical theories be applied in helping B reach an ethical decision?  
Q3.9. Would your answer differ if B’s professional code of conduct provided that 
lawyers should not breach client confidentiality under any circumstances?  
Q3.10. How helpful do you think ethical theory is in reaching ethical decisions? 
 
END TB   
 
Ethical discretion 
Lawyers usually follow their code of conduct when making ethical decisions. To do 
otherwise would invite their professional body to start disciplinary proceedings against them. 
William Simon argued that this is too limited an ambition.36 He thought that lawyers should 
exercise their own judgement and discretion in deciding what clients to represent and how to 
represent them. This is contrary to the standard conception of the lawyer’s role although, Simon 
would argue, it is more likely to achieve an ethical outcome. 
 Using Simon’s approach, lawyers would act with the overarching aim of seeking to do 
justice. They would be required to consider the merits of a client’s claim relative to those of 
opposing parties and other potential clients.37  They might consider the resources available to 
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each side in deciding what behaviour is justified. When deciding how to represent a client, 
weighing these considerations, the lawyer could sometimes to go beyond the letter of the law, 
but sometimes not even use it to its full extent.   
Under Simon’s ‘discretionary’ approach, rules of conduct would be seen as rebuttable 
presumptions. They would be regarded as instructions to behave in a certain way unless the 
circumstances suggest that the values relevant to the rule would not be served by doing so. The 
advantage of such an approach is that it avoids over-reliance on rules and engages the 
professional’s moral capacity. It is not inconsistent with having codes, but it does change their 
nature. Within such a framework, codes operate as advisory rather than mandatory requirements. 
 
INSERT TB 
Q3.11. What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring lawyers to exercise 
discretion, rather than just follow rules, when making ethical decisions? 
End TB 
 
There have been many suggestions for strengthening the ethical components of legal 
education. The report produced by the University of Birmingham Centre for Character and 
Virtues, highlighted four priorities. First, it said, more time is needed for ethics education in 
undergraduate courses and in vocational training.38 Second, law students need to embrace a 
range of ethical theories, including virtue ethics, to make sense of the moral nuances of being a 
good lawyer. Third, it favoured featuring models of ethical character, reasoning and action as 
much in such an education as those bringing commercial success. Fourth, it recommended that 
greater attention be given to informal learning on workplace culture, including opportunities for 
reflection on ethics in the workplace. 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCESSES 
 Disciplinary proceedings were one area that was not really affected by the Legal 
Services Act. The Act merely required that disciplinary tribunals be independent, although 
the different legal professions must financially support their own tribunals. 
 Status 
In England and Wales, the main legal professions have separate disciplinary tribunals, 
the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and the Bar’s Disciplinary Tribunal, administered by the the 
Bar Tribunals and Administration Service. These bodies enjoy a high degree of independence. 
While parties have a right of appeal to a Divisional Court of the High Court, and thence to the 
Court of Appeal, the unique expertise of the lawyers’ disciplinary procedures in dealing with 
professional misconduct is recognised and respected.  
 In Bolton v The Law Society39 a lawyer was convicted of misconduct, short of outright 
dishonesty, and suspended from practice for two years. He appealed to the Divisional Court, 
which quashed the sentence and fined him instead. On appeal, the Court of Appeal implicitly 
criticised this decision.  
 The Court of Appeal in Bolton held that The Law Society is the body best fitted to 
determine the punishment suited to misconduct by members of the legal profession and 
appellate courts should not be quick to interfere with the sentences the SDT passes. While the 
court had been wrong to interfere with the tribunal’s decision, it would be oppressive to 
reinstate the suspension because of the lapse of time between the offence and this appeal.  
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 Purpose 
 Where professionals are guilty of a significant breach of professional rules, they can 
be subject to professional disciplinary proceedings. In Bolton v The Law Society the Court of 
set out the fundamental principle and purposes of the imposition of sanctions by the Tribunal. 
Sir Thomas Bingham, then Master of the Rolls, said:  
“Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything 
less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions 
to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.”  
“... a penalty may be visited on a solicitor ... in order to punish him for what he has 
done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way ...”  
“… to be sure that the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence; 
and” “… the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' 
profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the 
ends of the earth … a member of the public … is ordinarily entitled to expect that the 
solicitor will be a person whose trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in 
question. Otherwise, the whole profession, and the public as a whole, is injured. A 
profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which 
that inspires.”  
Process 
 Infractions are usually investigated by the regulator, but cases are heard by an 
independent body. Different tribunals have different rules of procedure, but they tend to 
follow the format of adversarial proceedings.  Decision making follows a judicial process. 
Having decided that the accused party is guilty of a breach, the tribunal has to decide an 
appropriate sentence. This may require that a number of factors are considered. The criteria 
that follow are taken from the guidance given to those serving on Bar Tribunals.40 
 
Step 1  
Consider the following checklist of relevant factors:   Individual facts of the case - breaches of the Handbook will differ significantly. The 
panel is entitled to form a view based on the individual facts of each case.   Assessing the seriousness of the breach - How serious is the breach? Where does the 
breach sit on the scale of seriousness?   Culpability - how culpable is the defendant for the breach? Did the breach arise from 
planned or intentional actions?   Actual harm or the risk of harm - what was the outcome of the breach? Did the breach 
involve actual harm or the risk of harm? Does the breach impact the general 
reputation of the bar? Is there harm to the public as a result of the breach?  Aggravating & mitigating factors.   Personal circumstances of the individual barrister  Previous disciplinary/professional record - is the barrister of previous good 
professional standing (see paragraphs 7.1 & 7.2)  Reflect on any equality and diversity factors within the case and the panel’s 
commitment to the Equality Act 2010 (see paragraph 1.6 above).  
Step 2 – Look up the offence/breach within the Guidance (Part 2).  
Step 3 – Decide whether to reduce, stay at or increase the sentence in the circumstances of the 
case.  
Step 4 – Decide whether a concurrent or consecutive sentence would be appropriate.  
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Step 5 – Give your reasons 
 
INSERT TB 
Q3.12. Are the Bar guidelines a suitable guide to sentencing in cases involving other legal 
professionals? 
END TB 
v. Sanctions 
 Disciplinary tribunals typically exercise a wide range of powers, including the right to 
impose sanctions. For example, under the Solicitors Act 1974 s.47, the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal has the power to make ‘such order as it thinks fit’, including:  striking a solicitor off the roll  suspension from practice indefinitely or for a fixed period  the payment of a penalty   the imposition of conditions on the issue of a practising certificate  exclusion from legal aid work permanently or for a fixed period  the issue of a reprimand  an order for payment of costs41  
Penalties used to limited to a fine of up to £5,000 for each established allegation, but the limit 
was lifted by the Legal Services Act. Fines imposed by the SDT still appear to be relatively low.  
 Analysis of a year of disciplinary cases in 200842 showed strong correlations between:   
• Misuse of client money and being struck off 
• Dishonesty and being struck off  
• Dishonesty and being fined  
• Practising without being a recognised body and being suspended  
• Breaches of the Solicitors publicity code and being reprimanded  
• Failure to give proper advice / information / representation and being reprimanded  
• Breaches of the solicitors account rules and being fined 
 
In SRA v. Dennison the Court of Appeal held that striking off was appropriate for all but less 
serious cases of dishonesty even if, as here, client money was not involved.43 The test for 
dishonesty is that laid down in Twinsectra Ltd. v Yardley and others,44 where it was held that to 
be dishonest a solicitor must have acted dishonestly by the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people. He also had to be aware that, by those standards, he was acting dishonestly. Most 
cases involving intentional misuse of client money result in striking off.  
 
INSERT TB 
Q3.13. Consider cases of Respondent A and Respondent B.  
 
Respondent A 
R was a solicitor and former president of his local Law Society. He was convicted of 
voyeurism under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. He was charged under s.67(1) of the Act 
under which a person commits an offence if— 
(a) for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification, he observes another person doing a 
private act, and 
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(b) he knows that the other person does not consent to being observed for his sexual 
gratification. 
There had been no physical contact involved in the offence, no exposure and no involvement 
of a minor. In the Magistrates’ Court R was sentenced to four months imprisonment 
suspended for two years. He was required to attend a sex offender programme for two years 
and register as a sex offender. He received testimonials from senior partner in the firm where 
he worked and a promise of workplace supervision following the proceedings. He also 
received testimonials from some clients.    
 
Q3.14. Is R’s case one that should be brought before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. 
Why?  
Q3.15. Is R guilty of conduct unbefitting a solicitor or of bringing the solicitors’ profession 
into disrepute? 
Q3.16. Assuming R is found guilty, using relevant sentencing guidelines, what sanction 
would you apply? 
 
Respondent B 
R had recently retired from practice and was recently divorced. He wished to claim monies 
due under an endowment policy. In error the insurance company sent R a form that also 
required his wife’s signature, even though it seemed she was not a beneficiary under the 
policy. R attended his ex-wife’s home to find that she was not there. It was his last day at 
work  and he was going on a post-reitirement walking holiday the next day. He therefore put 
his wife’s name in the space provided for his wife’s signature and returned the form to the 
insurance company. He had attached a post-it note to the form explaining what he had done 
and why. The insurance company paid out the monies. The matter came to light when R’s ex-
wife was going through his papers. She reported the matter to the police, but the CPS 
declined to take action. She then went to the Law Society.     
 
Q3.17. Is R’s case one that should be brought before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. 
Why?  
Q3.18. Would you find Respondent B guilty of dishonesty?  
Q3.19. Assuming R is found guilty, using relevant sentencing guidelines, what sanction 
would you apply?  
 
END TB 
 
Inspection and Intervention 
 In addition to the power to prosecute cases of indiscipline before the SDT, the SRA 
can inspect and if necessary intervene in solicitors’ practices.  The powers contained in the 
Solicitors Act 1974 include the power to require production of solicitors’ accounts and 
production of documents.45  The powers of intervention arise, for example, where the Law 
Society suspects dishonesty, in the event of the bankruptcy of a solicitor or where it seems a 
solicitor has abandoned his practice.  
 Intervention usually involves closing down the firm, although this is done in such a 
way as to protect client interests as far as possible. Where any losses are not covered by the 
defaulting solicitor’s insurance, clients may be able to claim from the Solicitors Indemnity 
Fund.   
 
                                                 
45
 Solicitors Act 1974 ss. 32 and 34. 
THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007 
Background to the Act 
 Over the 30 years preceding the Legal Services Act 2007 government tried to control 
the legal professions. In England and Wales government shifted the system of legal services 
regulation towards direct government regulation with the professed aim of promoting 
competition and reflecting better the interests of consumers.46 Sir David Clementi was asked 
to prepare review the regulatory framework for legal services and to prepare a report. His 
specific brief in considering reform was to: 
‘(a) consider what regulatory framework would best promote competition, innovation and the 
public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective and independent legal sector; and  
(b) recommend a framework which will be independent in representing the public and 
consumer interest, comprehensive, accountable, consistent, flexible, transparent, and no more 
restrictive or burdensome than is clearly justified.’ 
Clementi reported in 2004.47 His wide ranging recommendations were outlined in 
Chapter 2. This chapter deals with his proposals for professional regulation and the impact that 
the subsequent Act, the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA) had on regulation. Clementi saw 
advantages in retaining elements of self-regulation. For example, he did not think that vesting 
regulatory control in a state agency, rather than professions, was a good idea. Further, he 
considered that disciplinary processes worked well.  
Clementi advised that the legal professions should operate under an ‘oversight 
regulator’, to control regulation. He also recommended that professional regulation should 
operate independently of the professional bodies. This led to the separation of the representative 
and regulatory functions of the professional bodies and to the establishment of the Legal 
Services Board (LSB) in order to oversee the regulatory function.  
Regulatory structure   
The LSA s.29, provided that the LSB should not interfere with the representative 
functions of the professional bodies, but it was also charged by a sub-section to with ensuring:    
(a)that the exercise of an approved regulator's regulatory functions is not prejudiced by 
its representative functions, or 
(b)that decisions relating to the exercise of an approved regulator's regulatory functions 
are, so far as reasonably practicable, taken independently from decisions relating to the exercise 
of its representative functions. 
The result of this was that the new ‘regulatory arm’ of each of the professions looked to 
the LSB for regulatory guidance. The regulator’s own former professional body had to be kept at 
arm’s length. The regulator could only listen to its views as it would with any other stakeholder, 
for example, through its responses to public consultations. The LSA provided a list of regulatory 
objectives which the LSB and the approved regulators were bound to pursue and promote.  
 
Legal Services Act 2007 
The regulatory objectives 
 
(1)In this Act a reference to “the regulatory objectives” is a reference to the objectives 
of— 
(a)protecting and promoting the public interest; 
(b)supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; 
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(c)improving access to justice; 
(d)protecting and promoting the interests of consumers; 
(e)promoting competition in the provision of services within subsection (2); 
(f)encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession; 
(g)increasing public understanding of the citizen's legal rights and duties; 
(h)promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles. 
(2)The services within this subsection are services such as are provided by authorised 
persons (including services which do not involve the carrying on of activities which are reserved 
legal activities). 
(3)The “professional principles” are— 
(a)that authorised persons should act with independence and integrity, 
(b)that authorised persons should maintain proper standards of work, 
(c)that authorised persons should act in the best interests of their clients, 
(d)that persons who exercise before any court a right of audience, or conduct litigation in 
relation to proceedings in any court, by virtue of being authorised persons should comply with 
their duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of justice, and 
(e)that the affairs of clients should be kept confidential. 
(4)In this section “authorised persons” means authorised persons in relation to activities 
which are reserved legal activities. 
 Regulatory philosophy 
Best regulatory practice 
Under the LSA s.28 approved regulators were required to have regard to: 
(a) the principles under which regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, 
proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed, and 
(b) any other principle appearing to it to represent the best regulatory practice. 
 
 Regulatory method 
Principles-based regulation 
 Before the LSA the regulatory method favoured by government was called Principles-
based regulation (PBR). Rather than the detailed codes of conduct favoured by professions PBR 
worked from high level principles which organisations were supposed to follow and achieve. It 
was used in the financial services industry and was considered to be a method of regulation that 
responded to the description in the LSA s.28. 
 The LSB championed a move away from rule-based regulation to PBR. The SRA was 
steered towards PBR by two reports for the Law Society, by Lord Hunt of Wirrall on regulation 
generally and by Nick Smedley on the regulation of large firms, both of which recommended its 
use.  In 2011 the SRA adopted a rule-book focused on high level principles.  
 
INSERT TB 
SRA Principles 2011 
1: SRA Principles 
These are mandatory Principles which apply to all.  
You must:  
1. uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice; 
2. act with integrity; 
3. not allow your independence to be compromised; 
4. act in the best interests of each client; 
5. provide a proper standard of service to your clients; 
6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the provision 
of legal services; 
7. comply with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with your regulators and 
ombudsmen in an open, timely and co-operative manner; 
8. run your business or carry out your role in the business effectively and in accordance 
with proper governance and sound financial and risk management principles; 
9. run your business or carry out your role in the business in a way that encourages 
equality of opportunity and respect for diversity; and 
10. protect client money and assets. 
 
 
Q3.20.  To what extent do the principles of the SRA Code of Conduct reflect the legal role or 
would they be relevant to any business? 
Q3.21. To what extent do the principles reflect the regulatory objectives of the Legal Services 
Act 2007? 
END TB 
 The Bar also revised its rule-book in 2014, adopting a similar set of high level 
principles, which it called core duties.  
 
INSERT TB 
Bar Standards Board Code of Conduct 2014 
B. The Core Duties 
CD1. You must observe your duty to the court in the administration of justice. 
CD2. You must act in the best interests of each client. 
CD3. You must act with honesty and integrity. 
CD4. You must maintain your independence. 
CD5. You must not behave in a way which is likely to diminish the trust and confidence 
which the public places in you or in the profession. 
CD6. You must keep the affairs of each client confidential. 
CD7. You must provide a competent standard of work and service to each client. 
CD8. You must not discriminate unlawfully against any person.  
CD9. You must be open and co-operative with your regulators. 
CD10. You must take reasonable steps to manage your practice, or carry out your role within 
your practice, competently and in such a way as to achieve compliance with your legal and 
regulatory obligations.  
  
Q3.22. What are the similarities and differences between the the SRA principles and the BSB 
core duties? 
Q3.23. Can you suggest reasons for any differences? 
 
END TB 
 Entity regulation 
 Much of the change in the new regulatory regime was driven by the Law Society’s 
decision to be a regulator for ABS. The LSA required ABS to have a Head of Legal Practice and 
a Head of Finance and Administration, among whose duties included reporting any breach of the 
licence in their area of responsibility.48 The SRA ‘re-branded’ these posts Compliance Officer 
for Legal Practice (COLP) and  Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration (COFA) 
and required solicitors firms, as well as ABS, to appoint such officers.  
 The SRA also promised to develop relationships with regulated entities. Occasional 
visits would occur to monitor progress. This arguably gives managers and those responsible for 
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behaviour within organisations a good incentive to ensure that there is a culture of ethical 
compliance. Some writers have referred to the organisation of a business to provide support for 
good behaviour as ‘ethical infrastructure’. The risk, of course, is that where a few managers 
become responsible for ethical conduct, ordinary employees may feel less responsibility. 
 Administrative sanctions  
 The LSA amended the Solicitors Act 1974 by adding s.44(D).49 The new section 
allowed the Law Society to issue a rebuke or to fine solicitors or their employees for breaches of 
the Act or of the professional rules without referring them to the SDT. The LSA also allowed the 
LSB to provide for approved regulators to fine ABS. Astonishingly, the levels of fine set by the 
LSB for this purpose were £250 million for an ABS and £50 million for an employee of an 
ABS.  
 The discrepancy between the levels of fine available to the SRA seemed grossly 
unfavourable to ABS, but in practice the difference was likely to be to the disadvantage of 
solicitors. In 2013 the SRA consulted on proposals to increase the ir powers to levy fines on 
solicitors asking for views on maximum fines between £10,000 and £100, 000. As the 
consultation paper observed, the lower level set on solicitors fines meant that the SRA would 
need to refer more serious cases to the SDT. This would force solicitors into a position where 
they would be paying costs that ABS would not incur.          
 Outcomes focused regulation 
The Law Society’s decision to pursue regulatory control of ABS also led to the Code of 
Conduct 2007 being amended in 2009 to make this right explicit. The need to regulate ABS led 
to a shift from the regulation of individuals to the regulation of entities, the organisations in 
which they work. Entity regulation requires that regulators exercise regulatory control of all 
those working in entities, professionals and non-professionals.  
An entity regulator, for example the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), could 
therefore be regulating an entity that may, or may not, include members of the profession of 
which it is also the approved regulator. The SRA decided to regulate solicitors and ABS using 
the same code of conduct. This decision underpinned a move away from rules designed to 
regulate the behaviour of individual solicitors to a focus on goals that an organisation might 
expect to achieve.    
One of the main aims of focusing on high level principles was to get away from the 
‘rule-based’ approach traditionally used by professions. The idea was that professional 
organisations should focus on the desired ‘outcomes’ of regulation rather than follow rules. 
After the financial crisis of 2008 PBR was rebranded as ‘Outcomes Focused Regulation’ (OFR).   
When the SRA introduced its new handbook in 2011 it contained the high level 
principles and the outcomes to be achieved. However, it also included indicative behaviours. It 
was not mandatory that entities or solicitors followed the indicative behaviours. Following them 
may demonstrate that the outcome has been achieved. They operate as a kind of default position 
for achieving the outcomes. It is arguable that this is an example of ‘situational ethics’; 
circumstances where there may be better or worse ways of satisfying an overarching principle. 
 The first chapter of the SRA Code, concerned with client care has 16 outcomes that 
must be achieved. The first outcome of Chapter 1 (Outcome 1.1) specifies that ‘you treat your 
clients fairly’. There are other outcomes that might also require treating clients fairly. There 
are also several indicative behaviours suggesting what ‘treating fairly’ may involve in 
practice. For example, Indicative Behaviour 1.1 is ‘agreeing an appropriate level of service 
with your client, for example the type and frequency of communications’. 
 
INSERT TB 
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COMPARING CONDUCT RULES AND OUTCOMES FOCUSED REGULATION 
 
Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007, rule 2.02(2) 
‘You must, both at the outset and, as necessary, during the course of the 
matter: 
(a) agree an appropriate level of service; 
(b) explain your responsibilities; 
(c) explain the client’s responsibilities; 
(d) ensure that the client is given, in writing, the name and status of 
the person dealing with the matter and the name of the person 
responsible for its overall supervision; and 
(e) explain any limitations or conditions resulting from your relationship with a third party 
(for example a funder, fee sharer or introducer) which affect the steps you can take on the 
client’s behalf.’ 
 
Q3.24. What is the feature of this text that gives the provisions the quality of rules?  
 
Under the SRA Code of Conduct, these rules become principles, outcomes and indicative 
behaviours. Arguably, the following are relevant: 
 
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 (as amended) 
PRINCIPLE: [You must] provide a proper standard of service to your clients    
OUTCOME:  O(1.5) the service you provide to clients is competent, delivered in a timely 
manner and takes account of your clients' needs and circumstances; 
SAMPLE INDICATIVE BEHAVIOURS:  
IB(1.5) explaining any limitations or conditions on what you can do for the client, for 
example, because of the way the client's matter is funded; 
IB(1.6) in taking instructions and during the course of the retainer, having proper regard to 
your client's mental capacity or other vulnerability, such as incapacity or duress; 
IB(1.7) considering whether you should decline to act or cease to act because you cannot act 
in the client's best interests; 
 
Q3.25. What might be the advantages for practitioners in using either conventional 
professional conduct rules or outcomes based regulation?  
Q3.26. To what extent does Outcomes Focused Regulation increase the use of a lawyer’s ethical 
discretion as advocated by William Simon? 
 
 Indicative Behaviours could function as rules if they were differently expressed. 
Indicative Behaviour 1.7 of Chapter 1 is ‘considering whether you should decline to act or 
cease to act because you cannot act in the client's best interests’.  
Q3.27. How could this be expressed as a rule? 
Q3.28. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of using a rule or an indicative 
behaviour? 
END TB 
    
THE SHIFT IN PROFESSIONAL REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW 
 Changes in the regulation of the legal services market have stimulated a number of 
changes in regulation. These can be represented in tabular form (see below). Each of these 
changes has been mentioned in the present chapter.  
Table: The different emphases of rule-based and outcomes based regulation.50  
    
Old New 
 
Profession-controlled Co-regulation 
Individual Entity 
Rules Principles 
Infractions Outcomes 
Observance Discretion 
Acts Indicative behaviours 
Investigation Accreditation 
Professional Responsibility Compliance 
Disciplinary Process Administrative Sanction 
Professional Community Ethical Infrastructure 
Heterarchy Hierarchy 
Deontological Situational 
 
Q3.29. Which developments can be taken as evidence of each transition detailed in the 
Table? 
Q3.30. How far do old and new methods of regulation respond to the requirement of the LSA 
s.28, which requires that ‘regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, 
proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed,. 
 
 The changes brought about by the LSA are symptomatic of changing attitudes towards 
professions in general and, possibly, the legal profession in particular. This is exemplified in a 
challenge to a new scheme of quality assurance for criminal advocates. The scheme started as an 
initiative of the Legal Services Commission, at the time responsible for legal aid, which was 
apparently concerned about reports of low standards of criminal advocacy. At the instigation of 
the LSB, the scheme was developed by the regulators for the Bar, solicitors and legal executives. 
The core involves judicial assessment of advocates’ performance in actual criminal trials.   
 The Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (QASA) strikes at the core of legal 
professionalism. It imposes external assessment of professional standards in a core legal activity. 
It also assesses performance in an area that has always been seen as key to the rationale of the 
rule of law, criminal defence. Four barristers sought judicial review of the LSB’s decision.        
Among its various roles the LSB must approve regulatory changes proposed by the 
approved regulators. In exercising this role it must ensure that the regulatory objectives are met 
and the better regulation principles are put into effect. The way in which these responsibilities 
are put into effect was illustrated when the QASA litigation reached the Court of Appeal. The 
barristers challenged the LSB’s approval of the scheme.  
INSERT TB 
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF (1) KATHERINE 
LUMSDON (2) RUFUS TAYLOR (3) DAVID HOWKER QC (4) 
CHRISTOPHER HEWERTSON Appellants 
 
- and –  
LEGAL SERVICES BOARD Respondent   
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- and –  
(1) GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR (acting by the BAR 
STANDARDS BOARD) (2) SOLICITORS REGULATION 
AUTHORITY (3) ILEX PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (4) LAW 
SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES Interested Parties 
 
 
The Master of the Rolls 
… 
8. If an approved regulator makes an application under paragraph 20 of Schedule 4 to 
approve an alteration or alterations of its regulatory arrangements, then the LSB must deal 
with such application in accordance with paragraphs 21-27 of that Schedule. Paragraph 25 
provides: 
 
(3) The Board may refuse the application only if it is satisfied that –  
(a) granting the application would be prejudicial to the regulatory objectives,  
(b) granting the application would be contrary to any provision made by or by virtue of this 
Act or any other enactment or would result in any of the designation requirements ceasing to 
be satisfied in relation to the approved regulator,  
(c) granting the application would be contrary to the public interest…  
… 
17. Ms Rose advances three principal submissions. The first is that QASA is unlawful in 
particular because the cumulative effect of ten particular elements of the scheme is to 
undermine the independence of advocates by exposing them to pressures which will tend to 
deter them from representing their clients effectively. The second is that the LSB failed 
properly to consider whether QASA would expose the advocate to such pressures. The third 
is that it misdirected itself in only considering whether QASA would actually undermine the 
independence of the advocate: it should also have considered whether it would give rise to a 
perceived threat to the independence of the advocate. 
… 
18. Ms Rose makes it clear that the vice in QASA is not in judicial evaluation per se, but in 
the cumulative effect of ten particular elements of the scheme. These elements are:  
(i) the scheme is to operate in the context of criminal trials, in which the importance of the 
independence of (particularly) the defence advocate from pressure applied by the judge is at 
its highest; (ii) if the advocate fails the assessment, he or she will be prohibited from 
practising criminal advocacy either at all or at the selected level; (iii) advocates are required 
to be assessed in the first two (or three) consecutive trials undertaken at their selected level; 
(iv) only two or, at most, three assessments are undertaken, giving very great significance to 
and increasing the pressure of each individual assessment; (v) assessments by a single judge 
may be sufficient to lead to a finding that the advocate is incompetent to practise; (vi) the 
assessment is conducted against very detailed performance indicators, many of which are 
highly subjective, and thereby increase the risk of inconsistent or unfair assessment; (vii) 
some of the matters against which the judge is required to assess the advocate depend on the 
judge’s perception or inference of matters which are privileged or outside the knowledge of 
the judge; (viii) advocates are required to notify the judge of their requirement for assessment 
before the trial commences; (ix) advocates are not required to inform their client that they are 
being assessed, nor even that they have been assessed as incompetent in defending their 
client; and (x) non-disclosure of the assessment appears to be an essential feature of the 
scheme: if an advocate were required to inform his or her client of the assessment in advance, 
a significant number of clients, if properly advised, would be likely to object to being 
represented by that advocate. 
19. Before we consider the ten elements on which Ms Rose relies, we should make some 
preliminary observations. First, assessing whether a scheme is compatible with the regulatory 
objectives and whether it is most appropriate for meeting those objectives calls for an 
exercise of judgment on the part of the LSB. This is not a hard-edged question. The 
regulatory objectives are not tightly defined. That is not surprising since, despite their 
fundamental importance, they are broad and to some extent aspirational objectives. That is 
evident from the language of section 1(1) viz “(a) protecting and promoting the public 
interest; (b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; (c) improving access to 
justice; (d) protecting and promoting the interests of the consumer; promoting competition...; 
(f) encouraging an independent...legal profession; (g) increasing public understanding of the 
citizen’s legal rights and duties; (h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional 
principles” (emphasis added). Moreover, whether these aspirations are achieved by a scheme 
is a question for the LSB and not the court. Section 3(2)(b) requires the LSB to act in a way 
which it considers most appropriate for the purpose of meeting the regulatory objectives. 
Section 3(3)(a) requires it to have regard to the principles under which regulatory activities 
should be “transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in 
which action is needed”.  
20. Secondly, the independence of the advocate is clearly an important relevant 
consideration. But it is not the only one. The “regulatory objectives” include “protecting and 
promoting the public interest”, and promoting and maintaining adherence to professional 
principles, which include “that authorised persons should maintain proper standards of 
work”. It is in the public interest that criminal advocates should not only be independent, but 
also that they should be competent. Lord Hobhouse said in Medcalf that it was fundamental 
to a just and fair judicial system that there be available to a litigant “competent and 
independent legal representation”. Competence is no less important than independence. The 
LSB is required to act in a way which is compatible with all of the regulatory objectives and 
which it considers most appropriate for the purpose of meeting all of the objectives. The very 
diverse character of the objectives may require a weighing exercise to be undertaken. As the 
Divisional Court said at para 56 of its judgment, the Act does not establish an order of 
priorities between the regulatory objectives, nor between the professional principles. For the 
most part they will be in harmony with each other, but where they are not, the regulators have 
to carry out a balancing exercise between them.  
… 
31. But the issue is not whether QASA undermines the independence of the advocate, but 
whether the LSB acted in breach of its statutory duty in relation to the question of the 
independence of the advocate. This is an important distinction to which we have already 
drawn attention. The statutory obligation of the LSB is more nuanced and complex than 
merely to consider whether the scheme is likely to undermine the independence of the 
advocate. First, the obligation is not an unqualified obligation to safeguard or not to 
undermine the independence of the advocate. Rather, it is “so far as is reasonably practicable” 
to act in a way which is compatible with the regulatory objectives and which it considers 
most appropriate for the purpose of meeting those objectives. It has to be satisfied that 
granting the application will not be prejudicial to the regulatory objectives which include not 
only encouraging “an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession”, but all the 
other objectives. These include protecting and promoting the public interest, supporting the 
constitutional principle of the rule of law, improving access to justice, protecting and 
promoting the interests of consumers as well as promoting and maintaining adherence to the 
“professional principles”. 
 
Q3.31. Can the LSB and the approved regulators achieve all the regulatory objectives?  
Q3.32  Based on this extract are regulators supposed to i) balance regulatory objectives ii) 
prioritise some over others or iii) apply regulatory objectives as the context requires? 
Q3.33. In your opinion is QASA a threat to the rule of law or does it strengthen it by 
improving the competence of advocates? 
END TB   
CONCLUSION 
 The regulation of the legal profession developed from supervision by courts (forum 
controls) to self-regulation by largely independent legal professions. In the last 30 years the 
state has significantly reigned in self-regulation, culminating in the Legal Services Act 2007. 
This introduced changes in regulatory structure by the creation of a Legal Services Board and 
the separation of the regulatory and representative functions of professional bodies.   
The LSA opened the way for Alternative Business Structures (ABS) to operate in the 
legal services market. ABS would employ lawyers to conduct reserved legal work and to 
supervise delivery of other legal services by non-lawyers. Existing regulators became regulators 
of ABS, leading to significant changes in regulatory practice. The SRA recognised that to 
regulate ABS, it would have to find a way of regulating personnel within the organisations who 
were not regulated as ‘approved persons’. These others might include non-lawyer managers, 
lawyers belonging to other professions and non-qualified employees.  
 The decision to regulate both ABS and individual practitioners with a single rule-
book had a knock-on impact on the form of regulation. The adoption of a method of regulation 
called Outcomes Focused Regulation (OFR) introduced high-level principles and outcomes that 
had to be observed. Taken together, changes in the regulation of lawyers represent a significant 
change in attitudes towards professions and traditional forms of regulation. They may represent 
significant steps towards the regulation of the legal services market by a state bureaucracy. 
 
